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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Oil has generated an estimated $600 billion since the 1960s. Despite this, the 
majority of the Niger Delta’s population lives in poverty… Their poverty, and its 
contrast with the wealth generated by oil, has become one of the world’s starkest 
and most-disturbing examples of the “resource curse” (Amnesty International, 
2009; 9). 
 
In this paper I seek to discuss the usefulness of the concept of the resource 
curse, by contrasting the theory to the context of the Niger Delta and the effect 
that oil extraction in the region has had on the wellbeing and livelihoods of local 
communities in the Delta. The Niger Delta region (location of Nigeria’s crude oil 
resources) is poor despite the enormous royalties from crude oil export since 
discovery in 1956. This analysis will attempt to identify how the unemployment 
situation in the region has provided a motive for youths to engage in violent 
regimes and illegal activities. The principal argument is that the changes in the 
Niger Delta are not as a result of natural effects from resource endowment, but 
rather the causal mechanism for the curse of natural resources - a weak 
economy, violence, underdevelopment - in the Niger Delta are more of a result of 
political decisions and strongly linked to human factors. 
 
Since the notion of the “resource curse thesis” was first used by Richard Auty 
(1993; 1) in his study of natural resource endowment and economic growth, an 
expanding number of studies on the effects of natural resource abundance on 
the wealth of nations have continually depicted mostly, adverse effects of 
abundant natural assets on the economic growth of resource-rich countries. The 
interest in the so-called resource curse may be related to the surprising fact that 
on the average, resource-poor economies often surpass resource-rich 
economies in economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 2). 
 
For the political scientist Ross (2001; 328), the “poorest” and “most troubled” 
developing countries have a considerable amount of natural resource assets. 
According to him, resource wealth is likely to make development detrimental. 
Indeed, it is held that countries with larger natural resource asset tend to develop 
slower than other countries with little or no natural resources. According to Ross 
and others, such as Karl (1997; 32) the natural resource curse – also called the 
paradox of plenty – stems from the close association, which will be further 
explained below, between resource abundance and ills such as low government 
accountability, economic decline, civil war, corruption and authoritarianism. 
 
Not everyone agrees with this explanation. For Wright and Czelusta (2004; 36) 
“resource curse” is a myth, “Minerals are not a curse at all in the sense of 
inevitability; the curse, where it exists, is self-fulfilling.” They conclude that 
minerals in themselves cannot be blamed for issues like corruption and rent 
seeking, rather they propose that it is the process through which policymakers 
and businesses handle minerals that determine the outcome on the economy. 
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Whether or not the presence of economically viable natural resource has an 
adverse or positive impact on the country’s economy appears to depend on the 
type of resources and host country’s circumstances.  
 
 There are a number of paradoxes regarding the economics of the Niger Delta 
and Nigeria at large that are necessary to explain, using selected theories put 
forward to explain the curse of natural resources. The Niger Delta region 
contains all of Nigeria’s abundant oil reserves. Crude oil resources account for 
over 85% of Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP), and it provides about 95% 
of the country’s budget, and accounts for 80% of Nigeria's revenue. 
Paradoxically, the region remains poor, largely as a result of to the ecological 
devastation from oil and gas exploitation and state policy decisions that exclude 
the indigenous people of the Niger Delta from the proceeds of the natural 
resources. Oil spills in the area have rendered the previous occupation of the 
rural inhabitants, farming and fishing, impractical. (Aaron, 2005; 1) 
 
The argument is that instead of seeing the present development in the Niger 
Delta as the result of the presence of abundant and highly valuable natural 
resources, the reasons for the slow-economic growth, violence and 
underdevelopment in Nigeria should be found more in political than in economic 
developments, and strongly linked to human factors. This leads to the following 
problem statement: 
 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Why is the Niger Delta region poor despite the resource abundance and wealth 
been generated from the natural resources? 
 
In order to answer this question a number of working questions have been 
formulated, as shown below:  
 
a) What is the nature of the alleged ‘resource curse’ and how has it been 
described by proponents and opponents? 
b) What are the realistic social, political and economic dynamics at play in the 
Niger Delta and to what extent is this related to the resource (oil) exploitation?  
c) Does the notion of the resource curse provide an effective and adequate 
explanation of the current situation?  
 
METHODOLOGY. 
I will first explore different mainstream and opposition theoretical positions 
approaches to understand the different ways in which the notion of the resource 
curse is being perceived. As representatives for a mainstream perspective, I 
have notably focused on the contributions of Paul Collier, who is among the 
most-cited political scientists on the matter. This is supplemented by 
contributions giving more emphasis to the economic aspects, derived from 
situations of resource abundance (Ross, Basedau and Lay, and Sachs and 
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Warner). Among those questioning the existence of such a curse, I have selected 
scholars such as Watts and Wright and Czelusta. Secondly I will try to test the 
applicability of the notion on the ground by looking at the realities of one of the 
resource-rich regions of the world, the Niger Delta (which supplies 2.62% of the 
worlds petroleum1), in order to explore the paradoxes surrounding the richness of 
the region and the relative poverty of its population. I will focus on the social and 
economic development in the region, including the changing livelihood conditions 
encountered and look at the scenario to find out whether the abundance in oil 
revenues from the region has increased social and economic opportunities for 
the local population and in those cases where this is not taking place, look at the 
constraints encountered by the local community. One factor that will receive 
particular attention will be the issue of youth unemployment. 
 
THEORETICAL LITERATURES 
As mentioned above, there are different opinions on the theoretical 
understandings for the explanation of the resource curse notion. While Sachs 
and Warner (1995) may insist on that “resource curse” is a realistic phenomenon, 
Wright and Czelusta (2004) are wholly against the idea of natural resource being 
a curse and consider it a myth. However, despite their different opinions on the 
notion, they all seem to have a common ground on the point that there is a 
connection between governance and natural resources availability in the 
explanation of the curse.  
 
The earliest literatures proposed economic hypotheses for the resource curse; 
the Dutch disease (DD) model - the most cited - is an example. The Dutch 
Disease notion was originally coined to explain an episode of economic decline 
in the Netherlands in 1959, following the discovery of a large deposit of natural 
gas in the North Sea. The notion explains the deleterious consequences of 
natural resource booms, in that, following the discovery of natural resource, as 
exploration and exploitation commenced the country’s tradable activities were 
fixated on the natural resource sector rather than the manufacturing sector, and 
then labor and capital that might be employable in the manufacturing sector were 
pulled into the natural resource sector and thus the manufacturing sector begin to 
shrink and become less competitive; while the non-traded goods (natural 
resource) area tends to expand (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 6). As the tradable 
(non-resource) manufacturing sector became less competitive and declined, this 
had a ripple effect on the entire economy, which declined equally (Olusi and 
Olagunju 2005; 160). 
 
This model was further elaborated by Corden and Neary (1982) who outlined a 
core model of the Dutch Disease, wherein they divided the economy into three 
sectors - the booming natural resource export sector, the crawling export traded 
goods (manufacturing) sector; and the non-tradable goods sector (services, 
construction, etc.). The manufacturing sector becomes dispossessed by the 
other two sectors due to an increase in the real exchange rate of the local 
____________________ 
1. http://www.ekekeee.com/nigeria-and-a-world-without-oil-by-henry-
nosegbe/ 
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currency, which in turn makes the manufacturing export sector activities less 
competitive and consequently less attractive to importers - all resulting in 
economic decline in the end.  
 
Other scholars have been more critical about the notion of Dutch Disease: – 
Hausmann and Rigobon (2002; 4), for example - sees this logic as relevant but 
insists that it (Dutch disease model) only emphasizes that the income from 
natural-resource sector would be associated with recession in manufacturing 
sector, not in overall economic growth; since the idea of the Dutch disease does 
not express any loss of welfare, it does not satisfactorily explain why a resource-
rich country would grow slowly.  
 
However, Matsuyama (1992; 139) further interprets the Dutch Disease notion to 
imply that the manufacturing sector characterizes an exclusive part of the overall 
growth process and if the returns to scale in manufacturing sector is more than a 
return to scale in the resource sector (due to the market volatility and prices 
fluctuation), an abundance of the natural resource may cause the economy to 
depend on a volatile area; this may explain the curse via the Dutch Disease 
model. This economic explanation for the resource curse is in contrast to the 
political science argument, which is more prominent in the literature on the so-
called resource curse, which will be described below. 
 
Recent studies on the phenomenon have suggested the key factors to be 
political. The political science literatures on the resource curse connect natural 
resources to weak institutions and poor management. For instance, Collier 
(2010; 1105) finds that although the foremost explanation for the resource curse 
was plainly economic (taking note of the Dutch Disease), recent studies find that 
the factors responsible for this scarcity amidst abundance and general slow-
economic growth - the resource curse - are political.  
 
Paul Collier, a Professor of Economics and Public Policy, is one of the 
mainstream scholars on political theories on the resource curse notion. He 
suggests that natural resources can affect the state’s political structure by 
undermining a regime’s accountability and also weaken the state security 
apparatus, which can provide an opportunity for rebellion. Collier construes this 
by describing the interplay between politics and natural resources. For him, the 
revenue from natural resource can shape the political system of a resource-rich 
country. Natural resources interfere with the political system by crippling two core 
elements of governance in an efficient state - security and accountability. 
Resource rents can deteriorate the functions of politics, making it prone to 
insecurity and like to be less accountable. According to Collier, natural resource 
affects accountability when the objectives of the elites and ordinary citizens are 
conflicting with regards to the provision of national public goods as opposed to 
accumulation of personal wealth. He finds that the smaller the size of the elites in 
the society, the stronger the incentive for them to choose personal wealth 
distribution (among themselves) over provision of national public goods. This 
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absurdity is viable in a country with weak judicial institutions among others. In 
addition, resource-rich nations with weak judicial system are more likely to 
experience low electoral accountability, and the politicians can loot public funds 
with little fear of prosecution when the electoral and judicial systems are bribable. 
For Collier, the issue of corruption is a domestic agency problem in resource-rich 
countries that connect to natural resources (oil) through revenue collection. For 
Collier, a lack of transparency (regarding negotiation for extraction rights, tax and 
royalty rates) is the primary causal factor because secret negotiations provide the 
incentive for extraction companies to bribe government delegates. Bribing 
government officials make it easier for multinational companies to cheat the state 
out of revenues that are due, and for government delegates to cheat the country 
out of payments made by companies. 
 
 Security, the second core element of an effective state, as Collier finds, that is 
weakened by natural resources due to the state’s low urgency to develop its 
security apparatus against external threats. After the significant decline of inter-
state wars and decolonization, most of the new-postcolonial states faced more 
threats from within than externally from neighboring countries. These internal 
threats are in the form of coups and rebellion as a result of inequality and uneven 
distribution of wealth. The risk of these political desecrating elements (coups and 
rebellious conflicts) provokes higher military spending - for repression of citizens. 
According to Collier (2010: 1109) military spending against external threats may 
be considered a national public good but when excessive spending on military 
aims at internal repression, it does not add to the state-capacity building and thus 
doesn’t pass off as a national public good. The military, designed for internal 
repression, disintegrates rebellious struggles while the military structure itself is 
deliberately and systematically rendered ineffective (by dividing it into several 
factions with unknown line of authority) by the state to reduce the risk of coups. 
Most of the postcolonial countries, Collier holds, did not need to build an active 
(and expensive) military against external threats. As a result, the urge to raise tax 
revenue (for the purpose of high military bankroll) did not increase. This is the 
security-taxation nexus brought about by resource rents. 
 
 Collier further indicates that most of the new-postcolonial states also failed to 
invest in a sound judicial system that would have minimized corruption and 
fostered individual prosperity. Most-effective states were built out of the need for 
higher spending on military during the period of interstate wars. High spending on 
military provided an increasing need for public money, and an avenue to rake in 
the funds needed was through tax revenue and government debt. A secure 
source of income was important for the state to raise the debt at a fair interest 
rate; this emphasized the significance of tax revenue. Consecutively the state 
had to build an efficient taxation system, which required time, fiscal capacity and 
adequate administrative structure to construct. In order to make this happen, the 
state invested in state-capacity building by providing an avenue for private 
economic activities to flourish; implementing essential support to the legal system 
that could enforce contracts did this. Therefore, it was in the best interest of such 
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countries to be accountable to the wealth generators. Promoting private wealth 
generation supported the state in reducing cost of borrowing and reduced the risk 
of seizure. 
 
In Colliers version of the ‘resource curse,' it is suggested that the risk of a coup 
creates a sense of regime insecurity, and this encourages the regimes to weaken 
their armies. Into this footing, he depicts three channels through which natural 
resource affects the politics of the state. Being a primary commodity, the first is, 
the opportunity that natural assets export provides for plundering: during 
conflicts, rebel predation on natural assets can escalate and provide the means 
to finance rebellion. Secondly, rebellion may not only be made feasible by the 
presence and exploitation of natural resources, it may be driven by the intention 
to take control of rents, during or after conflicts and even without a realistic 
prospect of capturing the state, natural resources make rebellion attractive; as it 
will provide a window for easier-looting during the period of chaos and 
lawlessness. The third channel addresses the issue of accountability: 
governments of resource-rich countries are less likely to be accountable due to 
the possibility of a deviating elite interest (pursuant of personal wealth as 
opposed to providing public goods) and low electoral competence.  
 
 As aforementioned, Collier’s model suggests that the political system and 
natural resource endowment compliments one another. NR (rents) affects the 
political system and that the political system affects NR. The nature of the 
political system of resource-rich countries has a direct impact on the exploitation 
of natural resources, in the explanation of the resource curse.  
 
 The role of the government regarding exploitation of NR is center stage due to 
its ecological characteristic. It is necessary for the property rights over natural 
assets to be explicitly enforced by the government. This is to prevent chaos and 
social dysfunction. Otherwise NR exploitation will significantly be socially 
impaired, and fewer resources will be located and the outcomes will be highly 
unequal, favoring only the strong and lucky ones. The citizens of the state, 
together own the physical assets endowments; however the government has 
custodial rights over the resources - on behalf of the entire citizens. The duty of 
the state administration, therefore, includes active management of natural 
assets, to the benefit of the citizens. Collier identifies some challenges 
associated with the steps involved in the management of NR. NR must first be 
discovered, and extracted, and the revenue must be appropriately spent. NR 
rents are distinctive from other sources of government revenue because they 
accrue from a diminishing source and thus temporal, and the NR rents are 
unreliable because they are volatile due to global commodity prices. Also, due to 
the nature of the NR revenue, it is necessary for funds to be managed judiciously 
by saving in the form of asset acquisition since the funds are from a depleting 
source. 
 
 Challenges of managing NR rents includes knowing the appropriate assets to 
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acquire and to decide how much of the NR revenue to use for acquisition. Collier 
finds that most country’s policies have focused on deciding how much of the 
revenue to be used for asset acquisition i.e. how much to save. The government 
of oil-rich states’ decision on how much to save is a function of what assets to 
acquire. 
 
 The concept of permanent income is the bedrock of the policy of the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund. Collier insists that developing countries are capital scare, therefore 
investing within the country is the best form of saving; thus building the 
Sovereign Wealth Funds within the country. Also, that domestic asset has higher 
returns compared to low-yielding foreign assets. Based on Collier’s model, the 
high-yield domestic investment will signify that resource-rich developing states 
can expect accelerated growth. However, implication of using rents for domestic 
assets is that higher returns will depend on the investment process. The 
domestic asset investment may encounter a problem of physical and managerial 
bottlenecks - besides the amount or rate of investment - that can affect high 
return. Collier’s Model for the explanation of the resource curse identifies four 
political decisions and processes that affect the extraction of NR.  
 
The first is insufficient prospecting: Collier argues that due to government lack of 
commitment and inconsistency, extraction companies can hold back on 
exploration activities that can result in loss of investment opportunity and 
unexploited potential reserve. The second is over extraction: this point suggests 
that biased political decisions are imminent if the society is divided and political 
powers are unstable. Incumbent regimes will have an interest to convert as much 
NR assets to capital while they still can, even at the expense of national public 
goods and social cost of extraction. The political decisions can be in the form of 
signing overgenerous contracts with extraction companies. The third is 
investment in public good: Selfish political decisions regarding NR may include 
plundering NR to invest in private capital and international borrowing against NR 
as collateral. Extravagant politicians may oppose the national public good of 
saving for future generation. The fourth political decision that affects the 
extraction of natural resource is have too little liquidity for smoothing shocks: this 
political process expresses the failure of resource-rich states government to 
acquire liquid foreign assets during the periods of high commodity prices to act 
as a shock absorber in downturn periods, since the prices are volatile and 
unstable. Collier suggests that borrowing against physical assets will amplify 
shocks rather than cushioning them. Nevertheless, this model indicates that well-
motivated governments in resource-rich countries face a time-consistency 
problem and cannot control the behavior of their successor; as a result, the 
incumbent prudent government may avoid saving in the form of liquid assets. 
This resource curse explanation insists not all governments are susceptible to 
these kinds of challenges, and the differentiating factor is the quality of 
governance prior to NR boom. The quality of the institution that can protect the 
use of resource rents for political patronage. With the absence of security and 
accountability, a given state encounters more fundamental problems besides the 
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mismanagement of natural assets. 
 
Michael Ross identifies crude oil as a resource curse due to its rentier, 
repression and modernization effects. By the rentier effect, Ross refers to the 
ways in which resource-rich countries use oil revenues to absolve civil pressures 
that demand higher accountability; he argues that this is carried out via taxation, 
spending and group formation effects. The taxation effect suggests that 
resource-rich countries are less dependent on citizen taxes for source of income 
due to the sufficient rents from oil resources export; this suggests that resource-
rich states imposes lower tax rates or, no tax at all, on the citizens in a bid to 
lower demand for accountability on the side of the government (Ross, 2001; 
332). The “spending” part of the rentier effect suggests that oil wealth may result 
in greater spending on patronage as a means of minimizing pressure for a 
democratic system of government, and maintaining a totalitarian rule (Ross, 
2001; 333). The “group formation” component of the rentier effect cites that 
resource-rich countries use their oil wealth to prevent the formation of civil groups 
that are independent of the government because such groups tend to push for 
political rights (Ross, 2001; 334). This rentier effect suggests that the oil revenue 
and spending policies influence regime pattern. 
 
His second point, the “Repression Effect”, proposes that resource-rich countries 
are likely to invest heavily in their military armed forces and security apparatuses, 
for the purpose of general fortification and repression of citizens, in a bid to 
withstand any possible pressure and to squash any potential tension and conflict 
(religious, ethnic) that may arise from oil-resources wealth (Ross, 2001; 335). 
 
Thirdly, Ross’ view on the curse of natural resources underscores a 
“modernization effect” of oil. This effect is not a political one that works through 
the state, and rather it emphasizes on the social changes that can mobilize 
citizens, and are brought about by economic development. This component cites 
that social changes, like an increase in the education level (that creates a more 
expressive public that is capable of communicating and organizing) and 
occupational specialization (that foresters a self-determining workforce that is 
accustomed to making their decisions on the job and armed with specialized 
skills that will enhance their bargaining advantage against the government) are 
necessary to bring about the push for democracy. This argument holds that 
resource-based economic development does not necessarily bring about the 
social and cultural variations that push forward democratic aspirations (Ross, 
2001; 336). 
 
Much like Collier, Basedau and Lay argues that there is a strong relationship 
between oil resource dependency and a high probability of civil conflict. Their 
argument, however, puts emphasis primarily on per capita income as a key factor 
that determines the onset of conflict. Their study finds that resource-rich 
countries with higher per capita wealth are associated with less violence, and 
have been able to maintain internal stability than resource-rich countries with 
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lower per capita wealth. They amplify this theory, by showing that government of 
oil-rich states with higher per capita income can maintain political stability using 
revenue from oil to engage in wealth distribution via patronage and clientelism, 
high military spending and protection from allies; this conforms with Ross’ rentier-
state theory; however, they find that Ross’ underestimates the stabilizing effect 
brought about by oil - that is a positive impact - in the prevention of armed 
conflicts. 
 
Further explanations connecting resource abundance with violence have become 
more prominent explanations to the resource curse in the light of the many 
violent conflicts, which have proliferated during recent years. “Natural resources 
have played a conspicuous role in the history of armed conflicts” Le Billon (2001; 
562) finds.  
 
Insurgency in resource-rich states and Africa is, however, not a new occurrence. 
In Nigeria, the first documented cases of conflicts linked to natural resources 
dates back to the early post-colonial era and young people have come to be 
participants in the violent regimes and rebellion2. Watts, (2004; 52) puts it "Oil is 
the theatre of conflict within which Nigerian politics is currently being played out."  
Michael Watts, on a more tailored note, puts forward a theory of “oil complex” to 
explain the resource abundance paradox, rather than adopt the general 
“resource curse” term. Watts holds that this phenomenon can be better 
understood if the form of governance into which it (oil revenue) enters, is initially 
taken into account (Watts, 2004; 76). This theory of oil complex is uniquely 
tailored for Nigeria as he addresses the state of political affairs at different levels 
of government and how oil enters into them. Watts acknowledges that oil has a 
linkage to conflicts, but contrary to Collier, who focuses his explanation on 
conflicts as a result of predation, looting or rebellion. Instead, Watts insists on 
seeing conflicts as the effects of the direct restructuring of pre-existing form of 
governance caused by oil. Kicking off with the historical pre-colonial politics of 
the country, he considers the presence of the multinational oil corporations 
(MNC) (which enter into JV - Joint Venture - agreements with the Nigerian 
government) to be part of the oil-complex, which he explains, produces an 
augmentation in the customary form of community law. Watts suggests that the 
presence of the MNCs brings about a change in the form of rule at the 
community level through property and land feuds that are caused by traditional 
demonstration and unrest around the Niger Delta. 
 
 The unrest are carried out with the aim of gaining access to compensation 
income from the MNCs, also Watts denotes that the civil unrest are created in the 
delta region with another goal of capturing central crude-oil revenue allocation 
through the creation of more local government institutions. Nigeria exists under a 
democratic federal system of government that characterizes forms of rule in three 
groups, the first is the national level (controlled by the presidency), the second is 
the state level (controlled by state governors) and the third is the local level 
(controlled by local government chairpersons and traditional rulers). In Watts’ 
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_______________ 
2 A secession campaign was led by Isaac Boro and some youths of the Ijaw ethnic 
group faction in 1966, the revolution lasted 12 days. See Osaghae, E. E., & Suberu, 
R. T. (2005). 	  
depiction of the political economy of oil in Nigeria, he identifies these three levels 
of authority as ‘governable spaces’ - The national (federal), indigeneity (State) 
and chieftainship (local) spaces - and he suggests that these forms of rule 
(created out of resources, territoriality and indigeneship) have contributed to the 
various forms of violence (besides rebellion and or civil war) incited by oil 
resources.  
 
 He suggests that these governable spaces within Nigeria strangely work against 
each other, there are conspicuous blunders between the spaces and each space 
has a central contradiction. Starting with the lowest, Chieftain (oil-community) 
level, Watts suggests an overthrow of the traditional gerontocracy rule in the oil 
communities by youth-led mafia control while the state level has the challenge of 
ethnic tensions and militancy, and the national level suffers from massive 
corruption and concludes that commercial oil production was inserted into a weak 
federal system of government. 
 
In addition, Watts’ oil complex theory suggests that Nigeria’s oil economy and 
violence is deep and goes beyond a simple function of “resource curse." He 
asserts that the case of Nigeria is not that the oil resource provides motive for 
secession rebellion, or that oil is simply predated by insurgents.  However, more 
profoundly, oil did not just play a deterministic role in the creation of insurgency 
and violence, rather the violence and insurgency emerged out of political 
struggles over centralized oil revenue. This political struggle includes party 
politics, the electoral cycle, intergenerational politics, organized oil theft and a 
long history of ethnic marginalization and exclusion (Watts, 2011; 69). 
 
He identifies five structural forces that operate within the “oil complex” theory. 
The first is the process by which the local ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta 
developed a political project for resource control, driven by the youth. The 
minority ethnic group, the Ijaws, is dominant in the Ogoni oil communities of the 
Niger Delta, mostly in Rivers and Bayelsa state. The movement originally began 
in the 1950s when some politically connected elders of the Ijaw ethnic group 
mobilized for the creation of an Ijaw state for Ijaw indigenes through formation of 
social groups (River State Forum and the Ijaw National Congress) to promote 
their aspirations. However, in the 1990s the elder-dominated movement was 
overtaken by youth politics and the creation of the Ijaw youth council in 1998. 
The social and environmental cost of oil exploitation, exclusion from the oil 
revenue (via the federal allocation process), unjust exploitation, misappropriation 
and broad history of theft became paramount to the development of the new 
youth-led political movement for resource control.  
 
The second process involved in the oil complex was the inefficiency of the 
Nigeria state, through military and civilian guises, to address the political 
movement in the Niger Delta without resorting to state-imposed violence by the 
military, police and security forces that lacked discipline. The third process 
involves the militant groups in the Niger Delta. Watts suggests that the militants 
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are a product of state-supported electoral thuggery, consisting of militias, 
organized criminals, cults and political militant who were bankrolled by corrupt 
and ambitious politicians and local political godfathers. The fourth process refers 
to the increase of massive oil theft business in which the militants were able to 
include themselves (as a subordinate beneath high-ranking military and 
politicians) provided the resources for them to acquire arms and energize their 
military offensive. The fifth process addresses the operations of the Multinational 
oil corporations. Watts cites that the MNC provides fund for youth groups to act 
as local security forces. The MNCs are willing to use military and security forces 
against protesters. Also, the MNCs have a corrupt habit of distributing cash 
payments to local elites under the disguise of community development, which in 
turn contributes to the facilitation and encouragement of violence and conflicts. 
The youths fought corrupt local leaders, and youth groups fought each other over 
access to payments, and inter-community conflicts sparked up over land claims 
and boundaries of oil-bearing lands.  
  
Watts is of the opinion that the political views on the resource curse notion, as 
put forward by Collier and Ross, is somewhat flawed because they do not take 
into account the pre-existing political dynamics of the resource-rich state. His 
criticism lies on the point that Collier did not specify exactly how oil can be 
plundered, compared to another natural resource like Diamonds; Collier suggests 
that oil can be looted because of choke points (pipelines, oil flow stations) that 
can be predated; however, Watts finds a weakness in this hypothesis because 
Collier does not say much about the forms of mobilization of the rebel 
organizations supposedly responsible for oil looting and how oil enters into them. 
Watt further expresses that other political studies on the resource curse notion 
did not consider the role of the multinational corporations (MNC) who are 
responsible for the resource extraction in these resource-rich states. Contrary to 
Ross and Collier, his line of argument links crude oil extraction to a pre-existing 
politics that consists of disunity, cultural differences, ethnic marginalization, 
segregation, destabilized institution and fragmented political practices which has 
disrupted the very idea of democracy and brought about violence and the 
ultimate crumble of nationalism in Nigeria. For Watts, the political economy of oil 
has reduced the force of the Nigerian symbol of nation building and stalled the 
building of a prosperous oil nation. 
 
Le Billon’s (2001) study primarily links natural resources to violence and armed 
conflicts. For him, the political economy of natural resources shows that violent 
regimes are motivated by the control of natural resources while the resources 
can equally provide the means for financing these conflicts. His view on the 
notion is that natural resources can be deemed a curse when there is a 
dependency on a single mineral-commodity. In such cases, resource-
dependency is associated with low-economic performance and high social-
economic inequalities; it can also provide an opportunity for armed conflict due to 
its lootability (capable of being stolen). The lootability arises due to accessibility: 
Governments commonly has custodial rights over natural-assets within the state, 
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and a weak judicial system encourages stealing, while rebels, on the other hand, 
can also capture these resources with minimal bureaucratic support. They can do 
this using their networks and established rebel-group strongholds (at crucial 
points like the location of resources and routes for transport), especially when the 
security structure is ineffective, and thus generate funds to finance their rebellion. 
He insists that the resource type, location and socio-economic processes 
involved in the extraction can influence the likelihood of political instability. 
  
Whereas Wright and Czelusta (2004), argue that other literatures give little 
consideration to the concept of “resource endowment” when disseminating the 
notion of the resource curse. In their view, other studies seem to homogenize 
“the export of natural resource products” with “resource abundance." Natural 
geological endowment is not a curse; it is the exuberant reliance on a single 
commodity export earnings (especially if the market in question is volatile) for the 
main source of government revenue that provides the room for the “curse” 
situation. In their scrutiny of the resource-curse notion, Wright and Czelusta 
(2004; 8) reveal that countries with resource-based development have come to 
be prosperous; not primarily because of their geological endowment per se, but 
also due to the returns to investment in country-specific mineral education such 
as investment in large-scale knowledge of exploration, geological know-how and 
transportation; as well as, investment in the technology of extraction, refining and 
utilization. Other countries with resource-based economies that have performed 
poorly have become so due to their failure to advance their natural resource 
potentials via appropriate policies. Their study also reveals that production and 
reserve level (of mineral resources) has continued to increase in well-managed 
resource economies through technological progress, further exploration and 
advancement in geological knowledge contrary to the opinion of mineral 
extraction being a depletion of fixed amount of natural endowment.  
 
Wright and Czelusta find the notion of “resource curse” to be questionable 
because it tends to portray the connection between natural resources and 
adversity more or less as a definite law. Collier suggests that oil creates 
corruption and insecurity. Watts and Le Billon sees the current crisis in resource-
rich countries as the result of how local and global politicians and other agents 
react to the possibilities opened through the oil riches. Watts and Le Billon states 
that the development of resource extraction and the way that the state develops 
are closely connected. This gives more attention to how politicians use the oil or 
other resources for other aims- Thus they also see the curse as a myth. “The 
generic label ‘curse’ cannot be applied without qualification’ as Deacon (2011; 
114) puts it. Not to mention Deacon (2011) expressed doubt regarding the 
vigorousness of large statistical evidence supporting the resource curse notion 
because some resource-wealthy countries - including Norway, Chile, Malaysia 
and Botswana- have grown economically.   
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ANALYSIS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
 The Niger Delta area is located in the central part of southern Nigeria, 
comprising of wetlands and dry lands including montane ecosystem, derived 
savannah, lowland rain forest, freshwater swamp forest and mangrove forest and 
coastal vegetation. The area spans across 112,110 km2 and makes up 12% of 
Nigeria's territory. Politically, the Niger Delta region consists of nine of the thirty-
six states within the Nigerian Federation. The states are Abia, Akwa-Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers - however, the major oil-
producing states in the region are Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers state, 
they cover 45,000 km2 and account for half of the regional population. There are 
185 Local Government Councils (LGCs) within the nine states.  
 
In 2007, the total population of the Niger Delta area was estimated to be 28 
million. There are 13,329 settlements in the Niger Delta region, 95% of which 
have fewer than 5000 inhabitants and rural. The rural inhabitants fall below the 
current poverty line (US$1 per day) and depend largely upon marine resources, 
farming and petty trading for their livelihoods - the systems of farming are 
predominantly small scale, distinguished by small land parcels, short-fallow 
cultivation system. Overall, 60% of the population is less than 30 years old, and 
almost 40% are between the ages of 15 and 29. The NDDC (Niger Delta 
Development Commission) indicates that the population continues to grow 
rapidly at a rate of 3.1%, and it estimated to hit 45 million by 2020. There is one 
doctor for every 150,000 people in the oil-rich states of Bayelsa and Delta. There 
are more than 40 different ethnic groups, who speak about 250 different dialects; 
no doubt the Niger-Delta is a region of extraordinary linguistic and ethnic intricacy 
 
 Nigeria is the largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, thanks to the enormous 
oil and gas reserves. When pumping at full capacity of 2,500,000 bpd (barrels 
per day), she is the eight-largest exporter of crude oil in the world (U.S, CIA 
2008). Crude oil discovery (in Oloibiri, Bayelsa State) in Nigeria dates back to the 
mid-1950s, and the exploration and exploitation continues till date. As the 
thirteenth largest producer of petroleum globally, Nigeria is the largest oil 
producer in Africa and harbors the largest natural gas reserves on the continent; 
Nigeria was globally the fourth leading exporter of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) in 
2012.  
 
The IMF (International Monetary Fund) report for 2013 estimates that, oil and gas 
export revenue accounts for 96% of total export revenue in 2012. Petroleum 
products accounts for 80% of government revenues, 95% of export revenue, and 
90% of foreign exchange earnings. This goes to show the importance of the 
Niger Delta region to Nigeria’s economy, and the Niger Delta Region holds 
Nigeria’s crude oil resources. Table 1.1 below shows an overview of crude oil 
export from the Niger Delta between 2004 and 2013, table 1.2 shows the 
average cost of crude oil between 2004 and 2013.  
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Table	  1.2	  
Source: NNPC - Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 
Source: infationdata.com 
Table	  1.1	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  ____________________ 3 https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/162709-nigeria-realises-n2-432-trillion-oil-revenue-january-april.html#sthash.zZZ1rmdG.dpbs  
From the table, a quick calculation can be made to show the average revenue 
generated per year, it is estimated to be over thirty-five billion dollars 
($35,739,235,712). This is not the exact state figure because an average price 
for crude oil was used. Between the months of January and April 2014, monthly 
economic report by the Central Bank of Nigeria indicates that 2.432 trillion Naira 
(over twenty-seven billion dollars - $27,238,500,000) was made from oil 
revenue3. This goes to show the amount of wealth been produced from the Niger 
Delta region. 
 
The business of oil exploitation occurs in stages, the prospecting, extraction, 
refining and distribution phases all have significant stresses on the environment. 
Due to operational accidents and equipment failure, some amounts of crude oil 
are released into the environment during exploration, processing, transportation 
and storage - this leads to environmental pollution (Aghalino, 2000). Report of 
the 784 incidents of oil spillage between 1976 and 1980 amounted to the loss of 
1,336,870 barrels of crude oil (Awobajo, 1981). Besides the physical damage to 
the country’s revenue, the impacts of oil spills are evident in the flora and fauna 
of these oil-hosting communities 
 
Ajibade and Awomuti (2009) therefore suggest that oil extraction enterprise has a 
physical impact on the people (dwelling around in and around the area) that need 
to be taken into account when evaluating the effects of crude oil exploitation. 
These impacts arise from the acquisition of land for test-sample pits and seismic 
activities, creation of oil platform pits, construction of access roads and rights of 
passage for pipelines. These actions have lead to deprivation, land desertion, 
degradation and deforestation, and the low reparation paid to landowners. A 
more pressing challenge followed up is the removal of topsoil and supplement 
soil and coastal erosion; in the long run the results are visible in low crop 
production, due to loss of soil fertility (Ikporukpo, 1983). 
 
Oil extraction may also have impacts on the health conditions of those living in 
the oil hosting communities. Within the over 1,000 oilfields in the Delta Region, 
gas-flaring (burning) activities has posed a greater health and environmental risk 
to the host communities. The adverse effect of unnatural gas in the air is the 
occurrence of acidic precipitation. When sour gas (hydrogen sulphide) is flared, it 
produces sulphur oxides that are released into the air; this fuses with oxygen and 
water vapor and the result is “acidic rain." The Ministry of Environment proposed 
the application of “Zero Gas Flares Policy” in Nigeria by 2003, the Multinational 
Oil Corporations (MNC) insist that the policy will not be technically feasible due to 
the high cost of investment required to acquire the needed technology. After 
pressure from the MNC, the Nigerian government compromised and overturned 
its initial 2003 deadline - which was extended to 2008 (Charles, 2003). As of 
2014, gas flaring persists in the Niger Delta. 
 
There are also Health consequences; People in areas affected by oil spill and 
environmental pollution in the Niger Delta complain about health issues including 
	   19	  
breathing problems and skin lesions thus affecting their ability to work. Illness 
can cause more serious economic damage to households than crop failure. The 
public health profile is poor: only half the population has access to safe drinking 
water, life expectancy is 47 years, patients can travel an average of 83 
kilometers to get access to a doctor, one in five children die before their fifth 
birthday (SDN, 2013). 
 
Prior to oil exploitation, the Niger Delta region people engaged in fishing and 
farming as means of livelihood. The Niger Delta region has always played an 
important role in the Nigerian economy.  The coastal area provided the ports and 
rivers through which the British were able to penetrate the Nigerian hinterland. 
Export commodities such as palm produce, timber, and rubber were exported 
through the region. Products from the northern part of Nigeria, such as groundnut 
and cotton, were also exported through the Niger Delta. The region has suffered 
from environmental degradation and deprivation since exploitation and 
exploration of crude oil in the area (Snapps et al., 2010).  
 
It is important to note that the traditional livelihoods have been greatly disturbed 
by the explosion of the oil economy: Among the local communities, fishing has 
traditionally been an important source of survival and income. Mangrove wood 
provides useful resources for making fishing tools such as making boats and 
paddles, fish stakes and traps as well as farming implements like yam stakes and 
fencing as well as for carvings, fuel and building timber. Production of Maize and 
Cassava make up the core elements of most families livelihoods in the Niger 
Delta as the farming systems are principally traditional subsistence crop farming. 
They consist of small- sized farm holdings of less than one hectare per 
household. Harvesting methods are manual; while processing and storage 
facilities are grossly inadequate; fertilizers, agrochemicals and improved seeds 
have not been widely adopted (Onakuse and Lenihan, 2008).  
 
Before the reaching of the oil companies, the average size of farmland per family 
was 800 square meters (40 x 20m) land holding. This size has reduced over time 
to an estimated 200 square meters (20m x 10m) of infertile lands. Growth of 
cassava (a major household crop) is stunted due to effects from pollution 
(Omoweh, 2005).  
 
The area of the Niger Delta most affected by the adverse impacts of oil 
exploitation are the communities where the oil wells are located, and on whose 
farm lands the oil pipelines lay across on. The community members insist that 
the fish or yam that they eat leave an acrid aftertaste of petroleum in their 
mouths. The crops are ruined, and now fishers have to travel much further to get 
fishes, the people in the affected communities depend on rain for drinking water, 
and even the rainwater is contaminated and unclear. By far the most-significant 
impact on peoples’ livelihood conditions can be related to the discovery of oil and 
the arrival of the oil companies; farming and fishing livelihoods are constantly 
exposed to the impacts from environmental pollution that leads to loss in 
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agricultural lands and fishing waters. Environmental damages and pollution 
brought about by the multinational corporations in the Niger Delta has ensued 
abuse of rights to a healthy environment, and good health, adequate living 
standard (infection is evident in food and water), right to sustain livelihoods 
through work, for thousands of people (Amnesty International, 2009). 
 
Exploitation oil natural resources affect the Socio-economic activities of the 
residents of the oil-producing communities. Farmers are compelled to seek for 
alternative occupations as due to deterioration of their land (Ikporukpo, 1978). 
Farmers and Fishermen who cannot conform would migrate to the adjoining 
urban cities, like Port-Harcourt, Warri, Ughelli and Eket, with the hopes of 
improving livelihood outcome, the implication of these involuntary movements is 
the worsening of unemployment in the urban centers (Agahlino 2000). 
 
Unemployment figure in Nigeria is unimpressive. Despite the number of skilled 
and high-income earning Nigerians employed by the MNCs, majority of Nigerians 
are unemployed. Fajana (2005) asserts that the exact figure on employment in 
Nigerian oil sector is non-existent, however he provides an estimate based on 
data from trade unions. The table below shows that Nigerians makeup about 
80% of the regular staffs in the oil sector and employment in the sector rose 
within 1999 to 2003 with an average growth rate of 10% annually. The data also 
indicates that Nigerian nationals also makeup the majority of contract and 
subcontract staffs. The oil sector cannot employ all of Nigeria’s labour force, in 
the following paragraphs an overview of unemployment in Nigeria is outlined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fajana (2005) 
  
The International Labour Organization (1982) defines unemployment or 
joblessness as the active search for work by people (who are without jobs) for 
five weeks without finding any. Unemployment in Nigeria increases at the rate of 
16% per year (Doreo Partners, 2013). Salami (2013) suggests that the 
continuous increase of youth unemployment in Nigeria has contributed 
significantly to the rise in crime and social unrest including the Niger Delta 
militancy and Boko Haram insurgency (Salami, 2013; 18). 
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The National Bureau of Statistics highlights that the unemployment rate in 
Nigeria as at 2011 was 23.9% and in 2010, it was 21.1% and 19.7% in 2009; this 
shows an increase in the unemployment rate. The NBS also finds that the rural 
areas have higher rates (25.6%) than the urban areas (17.1%). The report also 
indicates that the economically active population (aged 15 to 64) constitutes 
56.3% of the unemployed, those aged 0-14 and 65 and above represented 
39.6% and 4.2% respectively (NBS, 2011; 10). 
 
The table below shows the unemployment rate in Nigeria based on the 2011 
population figure of 164,380,000 people. The labour force accounted for 
67,250,000 people, within the labour force, 51,180,000 people were employed, 
and 16,070,000 people were unemployed.  
 
Table 1.4. Increasing unemployment in Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Salami (2013) “Unemployment, A Ticking Time Bomb" Vanguard, Vol. 
25, No. 61557, p. 19. 
 
The table below shows the rate of unemployment within some of the Nigerian 
states against the national average rate of 19.7%. Akwa-Ibom and Bayelsa state, 
both major oil producers, have high composite unemployment rate figures of 
34.1% and 38.4% respectively. 
 
Table 1.5. Unemployment rates by States (in %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adebayo (2013) points out the rising wave of crime in relation to unemployment 
and shows that despite Nigeria’s tremendous human and natural resource, the 
unemployment rate has been on the increase; youths’ unemployment and the 
increasing occurrence of crime both have severe implications for national 
development. Crime ruins social and human capital and deters local and foreign 
investments and reduces the quality of life, all of which reduces the quality of 
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citizens-states relationship. He cites corruption, rural-urban migration, rapid 
expansion of the education system, and a decline in manufacturing sector among 
others to have contributed to the rise of unemployment in Nigeria. Adebayo 
further indicates that the Nigerian youth (30 years and below) population of 80 
million represents 60% of the total population with a growth rate of 2.6% per 
year, between 2006 and 2011. Also, an annual average of 1.8 million youths join 
the labor force of which the majority have been either unemployed or 
underemployed even though the national demographics indicate that the youth 
population remain vibrant. 
 
The poor and unemployed in Nigeria experience frustration, deprivation, low self-
esteem, and acute want among others negative emotions. Correspondingly this 
poverty trap would uniquely provoke desperate diversification options - out of the 
need to survive - hence providing a motive for engagement in degenerative 
conducts like criminal activities and violence. Unemployment can result in 
poverty, especially when there are no widely accessible options and provision for 
welfare support from the state. Deprivation and an acute sense of want often 
lead the unemployed poor youths into crime and violent enterprises which pass 
off as a means of sustaining their livelihoods. The nature of these crimes 
includes car theft, armed robbery, drug trafficking, smuggling, food and drug 
adulteration, burglary, human trafficking, money laundering, internet scam, 
advanced fee fraud (419), bribery and corruption, gambling, rape, murder, and 
other illegal activities (Adebayo, 2013).  
 
Adebayo (2013) points out that youths are most volatile when their energies are 
channeled towards chicanery and unemployed youths do little to represent the 
driving force for development of their country to become useful resources. He 
points out, latterly there has been a surge in the frequency of crime committed 
which has ultimately led to the feeling of insecurity - among the populace in crime 
rife areas - over lives and properties. Crime undermines democracy and rule of 
law, which in turn slows developmental processes since it is a threat to the 
economic, political and social security of a given nation and often associated with 
underdevelopment. Crimes such as Murder and Armed Robbery amongst other 
transgressions continue to plague Nigeria, further to this; terrorism and 
kidnapping-for-ransom – the most recent of these crimes – have resulted in both 
economic impediment and bloodshed (Ajaegbu, 2012). 
 
Nigerians are employed in both public and private sectors of the economy, in a 
bid to analyze the resource curse theory in the Niger delta; it is important to recall 
that both Ross and Collier hint the unfavorable impact of lower tax rates in 
resource-rich countries. Ross’ rentier state theory expresses that low taxation in 
resource-rich states aims at hindering democracy, and Collier’s model conveys 
that low taxation comes about by the minimized desire by the resource-rich state 
to spend more on the military against external threats. The tax rate for Nigeria, a 
resource-rich state, is not far from the global average when compared to other 
developed economies like Denmark for example. Corporate tax in Nigeria is 
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30%, and the maximum individual income tax is 24% while Denmark has a 
corporate tax rate of 25%, and the maximum individual income tax rate is 
61.03%. 
 
However, the World Bank data shows that taxation makes up an excellent part of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) in Denmark, compared to Nigeria. In 
Denmark, revenues from taxation constituted 34.3% of the GDP in 2009, 33.6% 
in 2010, 33.7% in 2011 and 34.1% in 2012; these figures indicate that taxes 
makeup an important part of the Danish economy. On the other hand in Nigeria, 
even though the tax rates are not as low as that of Qatar, Oman and the United 
Arab Emirates where individuals pay 0% income taxes, the contribution of 
taxation to the GDP is quite low; in 2009 taxes made up 5.1% of the GDP, 2.3% 
in 2010, 1.8% in 2011 and 1.6% in 2012. This shows a decline in the contribution 
of taxes to the GDP and this might be the consequence of the increasing rate of 
unemployment in Nigeria. 
 
 The issue of taxation in relation to the explanation of the resource curse notion is 
not as reliable as Collier and Ross might have indicated. Although Ross’ rentier 
state theory was intended to address how oil hinders democracy in resource-rich 
middle eastern nations while Collier utterly showed that low tax rates in resource 
resource-rich countries (including Africa) systematically brings about a challenge 
of insecurity and low accountability. Nevertheless this does not satisfactorily 
explain why the resource-rich Niger Delta is poor. 
 
Amidst all the negativities emerging from the Niger Delta, It is important to 
equally note the effort of the state in their attempt to address the issue of poverty 
in the region. Overtime, the Nigerian government has created institutions and 
programmes to address the issues of poverty, under-development and conflicts 
in the Niger Delta. The first post-colonial administration in 1961, created the 
NDDB (Niger Delta Development Board). In 1976, the NDBDA (Niger Delta Basin 
Development Authority) was set up by the Military government; subsequently 
another military regime established the OMPADEC (Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission) in 1992. After return to democratic civil rule in 1999, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo setup the NDDC (Niger Delta Development 
Commission) to replace the OMPADEC. The new setup institution inherited the 
problem of lack of capacity and accountability from its predecessors. In 2007, 
President Shehu Umar Musa Yar’Adua offered Amnesty to the militants in the 
Niger Delta, in a bit to resolve the problem of insecurity (Pelesai et al., 2013; 51). 
 
 The NR revenue distribution is a crucial part of understanding the economy of 
oil. In Nigeria, there are four distribution mechanisms: a national account (income 
allocated by the federal state); a state derivation principle (the right of each state 
to the proportion of taxes that its dwellers are assumed to have contributed to the 
federal exchequer); a federation account or states joint account (which allocates 
revenue to the states on the basis of population, needs, and other criteria); and a 
special grants account (which includes funds designated directly for the Niger 
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Delta through the NDDC - an institution that is said to be notoriously corrupt). 
Over time, the revenues have drastically reduced (and thus, revenue managed 
by the oil-rich Niger delta has dwindled) while the states joint account has grown 
immensely. This process of budgetary centralism has been recognized as a 
radical one in which oil producing states (composed of ethnic minorities) have 
lost and the non-oil producing (ethnic majorities) have gained (Watts, 2011; 66). 
 
Unemployment has been linked to the onset of crime and other forms of violent 
regimes as aforementioned (See Adebayo, 2013). Criminal activities, besides 
being morally and societally wrong, can be seen as an individual survival strategy 
- diversification. Frank Ellis notes that diversification can be associated with a 
desperate struggle for survival in declining economies (Ellis, 1998; 2). The results 
of the 2010 country poverty assessment survey indicate that 46.0% of Nigerians 
live below the poverty line (US$1 Per Day) nationally, while urban and rural areas 
account for 34.1% and 52.8% respectively (World Bank, 2014). 90% of the rural 
dwellers in the Niger Delta fall below the poverty line of -$1 per day, and between 
1970 and 2000 the amount of people living below the poverty line increased from 
36% to more than 70%, from 19,000,000 to a whooping 99,000,000 (Watts, 
2011; 64).  
 
Violence in the Niger Delta became more pronounced in December 2005, on a 
political stage, after a militant group called MEND (the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta) emerged. The violent group struggled against 
the Nigerian state over the ownership of oil resources, how the revenue should 
be distributed and demand for payment over the political operations during the 
2005 April elections in Rivers state. Desperate politicians, in an environment of 
uncertain and unstable political, have attempted to gain the upper hand by use of 
political thuggery (a notion that sprung up in the oil region, and the federation 
over the last decade) to push their political ambitions, and this is where the Niger 
Delta militias come into play (Watts, 2011; 58). Organized robbery by gangs of 
gangs of estranged and angry youths has increased during the post-election 
months (Watts, 2011; 55). 
 
Anger, dissent and poverty have nourished the driving force behind the militancy, 
organized crime and insurgent politics in the Niger Delta. Watts (2011) suggests 
that some sources estimate that more than 25,000 trained militants operate in the 
creeks of the Niger Delta and earn up to 50,000.00 Naira per month, which is 
twice the average minimum wage (18,000 Naira4) that might be earned by an 
educated youth employed in the formal sector in Nigeria. A survey in some of the 
Niger Delta communities revealed that 36% of the community members are 
willing to take up arms against the state (Oyefusi, 2007; 16). An Ogoni right 
campaigner, Ledum Mittee, notes that there is an overwhelmingly large sympathy 
for what the militants are doing. The militants are known to engage in oil 
bunkering (theft) activities. An SDN (Stakeholder Democracy Network) report 
indicates that the some of the oil producing communities support the oil 
bunkering activities, despite the environmental impact, as it compensates for 
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those livelihood assets lost from the deterioration of soils and fishing water. The 
report quoted an interviewee to have said “The government and oil companies 
are collecting our oil, and we don’t have jobs, no money, so we have to collect 
the oil and refine our own. We have no fish in these creeks because of pollution; 
even the few farmers we have, their farm lands have been polluted with oil, so 
they all joined the practice of illegal oil refining” (SDN, 2013; 6). 
 
 The crisis that prevailed in the Niger Delta in 2007 is not solely about crime but 
politics. It is more about the legitimacy of government and about rule of law. 
Local robbery within the city reflects the reality that criminals know full well that 
they can carry out their activities with impunity because a larger part of the 
government is a fraud and racket. A racket in the sense that state activities and 
public offices are both generally understood to be nothing far from organized 
crime (Watts, 2011; 56). Michael Watts is of the opinion that Nigeria has become 
a storm of corruption, waste, missed opportunity and venality. The corruption 
includes money laundering and fraud on gigantic scales, missing billions and 
inflated contracts in almost all aspect of public life; touts, gangs and the police 
involved in taking bribes from the various corrupt operations.  
 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
The resource curse theory attempts to explain the reason for the scarcity and low 
development in the midst of abundance, insisting that majority of the citizens of 
resource-rich countries are poor. The resource curse is indeed applicable to the 
situation of the Niger Delta in Nigeria however; none of the theories put forward 
explicitly explains the situation on the ground, they identify some of the issues 
but not all. The Dutch Disease theory of resource curse certainly does not apply 
to the Niger Delta, as the scenario on ground is not related to economic factors 
like a decline in the manufacturing sector. Paul Collier’s idea did not take into 
consideration the situation of the people at the grass root level or the effect of the 
multinational oil companies. Michael Ross indicates that the poorest people often 
reside in resource-rich countries, but his Rentier state theory does not say much 
about the poor people and exactly why they have come to be so.  
 
Although Michael Watts (2004) “economies of violence” theory paints a very 
gloomy picture of the political climate in Nigeria, he insists that political factors 
such as weak institution and corruption are the reasons for the poor situation in 
the Niger Delta. His oil complex theory provides a much better understanding of 
the dynamics at play in the Niger Delta and why the people have remained poor, 
generally the oil-complex theory sheds a whole different light on the “resource 
curse” phenomenon. Wright and Czelusta perhaps gives the most coherent 
explanation of the resource cures, they are of the opinion that “resource curse” is 
a myth and the presence of geological endowment in state cannot be considered 
to be a calamity, nevertheless it is how the minerals are been put to use by the 
government decisions that matter most.  
________________ 
4 http://www.minimum-wage.org/international/en/Nigeria	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It is clear that oil exploitation activities have a direct impact on the lives of the oil-
hosting communities, based on their relationship with their land as farmers, their 
swamps, rivers and creeks as fishermen, and their cultural life. Watts’ economies 
of violence theory shed more light on the monumental neglect and deprivation 
suffered by the Niger Delta region due to ethnic marginalization which has 
resulted to widespread poverty, and economic hardship experienced by the 
people. Furthermore, lack of basic socio-economic infrastructure, environmental 
degradation and high rate of unemployment also adds up to the situation that has 
further led to youth restiveness and militia activities in the area. 
 
The main cause of poverty in the Delta is the loss of livelihood of the residents in 
the oil communities who are predominantly farmers and fishers. With polluted 
fishing waters and farmland, they are forced to diversify and find alternative 
source of sustaining livelihood. With the absence of jobs and infrastructural 
facilities (such as stable electricity) that promotes entrepreneurship – there isn’t 
much that can be done to find alternatives other than rural-urban migration to 
neighboring urban centers in search of greener pastures. The problem with this is 
that, the rural-urban migration adds up to the already amounting number of 
unemployed people.  
 
The resource curse theories put forward have failed to mention the direct 
physical impact of natural resource – especially crude oil – on the livelihood of 
the people who reside around the oil producing areas; a loss of source of income 
will inevitably lead to poverty, and this could explain why the majority of the 
people in the Niger Delta oil communities have remained poor. The violent 
activities carried out by the youth including militancy and oil bunkering in the 
Niger Delta can be interpreted as a means of sustaining livelihoods due to the 
high rate of unemployment and grievance towards the state. 
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